Basing on the individual behavior preferences, we analyze the evolutionary stable strategies of supply chains, where each chain consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. There are many manufacturers and retailers in the economic system. A retailer and a manufacturer interact with each other randomly. A manufacturer or retailer has two behavioral preferences: fairness concern and altruism concern. We get the evolutionarily stable strategies under linear demand and nonlinear demand. By analyzing, the evolutionary stability of Nash equilibrium is distinct under different demand types. The evolutionarily stable strategies of the manufacturer and retailer depend on their preference parameters.
Introduction
In the experimental economics, objectives often show non-selfish behavior, such as fairness, altruism, etc. Fairness implies that goods or resource should be distributed by a perceived appropriateness in a society, group or organization in economics. While altruism refers to the behavior by an individual that increases the fitness of another individual, even this behavior may decrease the fitness of the actor. Fairness is a popular topic in the behavior research, for instance, some scholars find that there is a strong feelings of fairness about the products' price for the consumers individual's preference. However, these papers few combine the two fields to examine the effect of preference on the dynamics of supply chains. Our paper is different with the existing literature at two points. First, we study the dynamics of players' strategies in the long term rather than one-shot game, focus on the evolutionary stability of manufacturers' and retailers' strategies in the supply chains. Second, we study the evolution of strategies with fairness and altruism preferences under different demands, and analyze the effects of individual preferences and demand type on the evolutionarily stable strategies.
Model analysis
We assume that there are many (a sufficiently large number of) manufacturers and retailers in the market. They match randomly to play a two-person manufacturer Stackelberg game. Let the unit wholesale price be w and the selling price be p. The manufacturer and the retailer have two pure pricing strategies: fairness concern and altruism concern.
Mathematical models
In this section, we examine the effects of fairness concern and altruism concern on a channel with one manufacturer and one retailer. If a player cares about fairness, he maximizes his utility that includes two parts: one is monetary payoff and the other is the disutility due to inequity. If he is altruism concern, he maximizes the combination of his profit and the profit of his opponent. Assuming the market demand is given by , and only the manufacturer incurs a unit production cost c (0<c<1) in this channel. We use and to denote the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer in this supply chain, respectively. First, if only the retailer concerns fairness, the manufacturer is altruistic. Then the retailer will maximize a utility function that accounts for the retailer's monetary payoff as well as his concern about fairness when setting his price. We can write Otherwise, .
Similarly, under the assumption , we get the equilibrium profits for the manufacturer and retailer as Table 1 . Here denote the degrees of fairness from disadvantage profit for manufacturers and the degree of fairness from advantage profit for retailers, respectively. The superscripts f and a denote the strategy fairness and altruism, the first one is the strategy of manufacturers, and the second one is the strategy of retailers. Subscripts m and r denote the profits of manufacturers and retailers. When , we can similarly analyze the dynamics of the supply chain.
Evolutionary analysis
We assume the principle of an individual choose his strategy is the strategy that gets a higher profit has the higher probability to be chosen in the further interaction. The change of the shares of the manufacturer and retailer using altruistic strategy satisfy the replicator dynamics. Let x denote the share of manufacturers using altruistic strategy, y denote the share of retailers using altruistic strategy, then shares of manufacturer and retailer using fair strategy are , , respectively. Two-tuple (x, y) means that there are manufacturers with proportion x using strategy altruism, retailers with proportion y using strategy altruism. Thus, basing on the replicator dynamics and the stability of the differential equation, we get the results as follows. Figs. 1-4 , the four strategy profiles: two symmetry strategy profiles and two asymmetry strategy profiles, specially, both manufacturer and retailer use strategy altruism or fairness, manufacturers use strategy fairness and retailers use strategy altruism, and manufacturers use strategy altruism and retailers fairness may be evolutionarily stable strategy depend on their preference parameters. When the degree of fairness to the manufacturer is high, the manufacturer should use altruistic strategy; correspondingly, when the degree of fairness for the retailer is high, then he should use altruistic strategy. The degree of the retailer is relatively low, when the degree of altruism to the manufacturer is relative high, the manufacturer should use fair strategy, when the degree of altruism to the manufacturer is relatively low, he should use altruistic strategy. The evolutionary stability of strategy depends on the relative values of individual preference parameters.
The impact of demand type
For analyzing the effect of demand type on the evolutionarily stable strategies in the supply chain, we discuss the case that the demand is a linear function of price in this section. Assuming the demand is given by , we study the evolutionarily stable strategies.
Equilibrium outcomes under linear demand function in the one-shot game
First, we consider the case that the profit of the manufacturer is higher than the retailer's. So in the case where the manufacturer is an altruist and the retailer cares about fairness, the optimization problems of the manufacturer and retailer are , , respectively. Here denotes the degree of altruism of the manufacturer.
From
, we get the second order condition is true. Similarly, we can get the second order condition for also is true. Thus we obtain the equilibrium outcomes of manufacturers and retailers in the one shot game. The specific outcomes are shown in Appendix. Basing on the calculation, we get five payoff matrices depend on the values of the preference parameters. We focus on one case in our paper, the others can be analyzed using the similar method. We get payoff matrix when , , Table 2 . are the altruism parameters of the retailer and manufacturer, respectively. The superscripts f and a denote the strategy fairness and altruism, the first one is the strategy of manufacturers, and the second one is the strategy of retailers. Subscripts m and r denote the equilibrium profits of the manufacturer and retailer.
Evolutionarily stable strategy under linear demand function
In this subsection, we analyze the evolutionary stable strategies. Let be the fraction of manufacturers who are altruism concern, and be the fraction of retailers who are altruism concern, we get the replicator dynamics Hence, we have results as below basing on the numerical simulation. Proposition 2 The points (0, 1) and (1, 1) are unstable. While the point (0, 0) is asymptotically stable as the value of a β is large, the point (1, 0) is asymptotically stable as the value of a β is small. From Proposition 2, we know that if the manufacturer does not care a lot about altruism, then he decides his wholesale price by maximizing his function of altruism and the retailer decides his market price by maximizing his fair utility is the evolutionary stable strategy; if the manufacturer cares a lot about altruism, then the strategy profile where both manufacturer and retailer decide their prices by maximizing the function of their fair utilities is the evolutionary stable strategy.
The impact of demand type on evolutionarily stable strategy
In the above analysis, we get the evolutionarily stable strategies of manufacturers and retailers under linear demand and non-linear demand. From the Propositions 1 and 2, although the conditions of parameters to the evolutionarily stable strategies are independent of the demand parameters, the results are distinct under different demand type. Under the non-linear demand, when the retailer is fairness concern, the equilibrium profit of manufacturers is always less than the equilibrium profit of retailers, and the equilibrium outcomes in the one shot game under linear demand are richer than those under non-linear demand.
Basing on Proposition 2, when the degree of altruism of the manufacturer is high, he chooses the fair strategy, and when the degree is relative low, he chooses the altruistic strategy. Those results are similar to those in Proposition 1. However, in Proposition 2, retailers always use fair strategy under linear demand, while according to Proposition 1, under non-linear demand, when the degree of fairness of retailers relatively high, retailers use strategy altruism is a better strategy in the long term interaction. The possible reason is that if the retailer cares about fairness very much, the disutility from inequity will hurt his benefit. Furthermore, from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, the strategy profile that both the manufacturer and the retailer use strategy altruism can be an evolutionarily stable strategy under non-linear demand, while the result is not true under linear demand. Hence, though the conditions of individual preference parameters that satisfy the evolutionarily stable strategies do not depend on the demand function directly, the demand type is an important factor to the evolutionarily stable strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer.
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the evolutionary stable strategy in the supply chain consists of many manufacturers and retailers. We assume that each manufacturer or retailer has two kinds of strategies to choose: fairness, altruism. We get that the evolutionary stable strategy depends on the values of fairness or altruism parameters. Furthermore, the market demand also affects the strategy choice of manufacturers and retailers. However, we get some results about individual's preference fairness or altruism by numerical examples, next we will continue to analyze the situation completely.
Similarly, when both the manufacturer and retailer are fairness concern, the profit of manufacturer and retailer are as follows When both the manufacturer and retailer are altruism concern, the profits of the manufacturer and retailer are , ,
respectively. Similarly, we can get the equilibrium outcome when the profit of retailers higher than that one of manufacturers.
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